POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

THE CONDITIONS WHICH LEAD POLITICAL PARTIES TO ADOPT PROGRESSIVE POLICIES

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Abstract:

This paper analyzes the role of political parties in a democracy: how political parties fall short of their 'ideal' functions when they adopt clientelist versus programmatic tactics to gain power; and uses data from International IDEA's *Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* project to conduct an exploratory analysis of the conditions and processes within parties that may promote the adoption or support of progressive policies, in particular pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies.

The paper suggests four initial findings which provide an insight into some of the factors that correlate well with progressive policies. They present a complex relationship between internal party conditions and progressive policy positions. Unlike much of the literature that claims that gender quotas and democratic internal processes promote progressive policies, this preliminary analysis suggests there may be limits to these claims and that these measures are insufficient for promoting a progressive agenda.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The literature on democracy and democratic transition identifies political parties as one of two fundamental defining features of a democracy, the other being voters. Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy* (1971) provides a two dimensional portrayal of democracy in which political parties and citizens play the key roles in a democracy: parties compete for power by presenting a political platform that presents the party's policy position, principles, and/or vision for the country, and voters support the political party that best aligns with their own political interests. Elections ensure that political parties work to represent the public's interests and that parties are held accountable by voters.

Like Dahl, the overwhelming number of democratic theorists, regardless of whether they employ a minimalist conception of democracy or a liberal one, all hold political parties as a major, if not *the* major, component of a democracy. The overall view is that a strong and sustainable democracy is dependent on well-functioning political parties (Downs, 1951; Schattsneider, 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Huntington, 1993). Political parties articulate and aggregate diverse interests, recruit and present candidates, and develop competing policy proposals that provide people with choices (Downs, 1957; O'Donnell, 1994 and 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Keefer, 2005). In essence, the fundamental trait of a democracy is the open competition between political parties in elections, by which voters can select between political parties that present a distinct set of policy promises/proposals.

Despite such an essential role, throughout the world political parties find themselves in crisis. Unpopular and increasingly distrusted, they have suffered declines in membership and are often failing to attract or mobilize new intellectual and organizational energy. Although political parties are expected to play an active and responsible role in the process of democratization, they often struggle to mobilize, organize, and legitimately finance themselves. Parties are failing to lead, represent, and educate their constituencies and meet their expectations of rapid dividends from democracy.

This paper analyzes the theoretical role of political parties in a democracy: how political parties fall short of their 'ideal' functions when they adopt clientelist versus programmatic tactics to gain power; and uses data from the International IDEA's *Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* project to conduct an exploratory analysis of the conditions and processes within parties that may promote the adoption or support of progressive policies, in particular pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies.

This pilot analysis is not intended to find causal relations. Instead, it is a preliminary effort to mine IDEA's database of political parties and to identify relationships that may exist between certain traits of political parties and the policies they adopt. Many scholars and practitioners argue that the internal conditions within a party shape the ability of parties to support particular policies. For example, it is generally claimed that more democratic and transparent internal (s)election of candidates lead parties to promote progressive policies (Keefer, 2005). Similarly, many scholars and policy makers also claim that gender quotas within political parties will help promote women to positions of power and thus promote a pro-women agenda.

But little research exists to support these claims or to understand how the internal conditions of parties shape how a party promotes certain policies. Thus, there is a clear need to study the relationship between a party's internal organization, management and operation and a party's policy choices. The pilot project presented in this paper is an initial, if partial, study of these dynamics.

The pilot project looks at 38 parties in 11 countries. While this limited sample and the structure of the pilot project is not appropriate to reach any robust causal relations, it is sufficient to accomplish two key functions: to assess the state of the IDEA database and how it can be leveraged for future study of these issues; and to look for potential links between internal party processes and conditions, on the one hand, and progressive policies, on the other.

The project's exploratory analysis identified four trends:

1. Parties that self-identify as left-of-center consistently tended to promote more pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies than right-of-center parties;[1]

2. Parties with undemocratic processes for choosing their leadership, candidates and platforms correlated with progressive policies more than parties with more democratic internal processes;

3. Parties with gender quotas seem to support pro-poor policies, but there was no consistent relationship between gender quotas and pro-women and conflict-sensitive policies, suggesting that gender quotas may not be sufficient to promote a pro-women agenda;

4. Parties that provided multiple mechanisms for their members to communicate with party leaders tended to support pro-poor and conflict-sensitive policies, but were not pro-women; this implies that democratic policies may not always lead to progressive policies.[2]

While not conclusive or causal, these four findings provide an insight into some of the factors that correlate well with progressive policies. They present a complex relationship between internal party conditions and progressive policy positions. Unlike much of the literature that claims that gender quotas and democratic internal processes promote progressive policies, the pilot project suggests there may be limits to these claims and that these measures are insufficient for promoting a progressive agenda. This suggests that efforts to promote progressive policies need to focus on party leaders to get them to normatively 'buy into' progressive policy positions.

2. INTRODUCTION

All societies in all parts of the world have conflicts. These can be social, cultural, ethnic, economic, political, ecological, and so on. Without proper rules of engagement, conflicts can be violent and detrimental to development. Political parties are a way of ordering conflicts and organizing different factions to play by a set of political rules that promote a peaceful handling of these conflicts. Political parties are, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Schlesinger (1984), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), the way members of different factions coordinate themselves into groups and oppose other organized political groups within a body of politics.

In a democracy, these competitions between organized groups are peaceful and follow a set of prearranged rules structured around elections. This identifies some of the characterizations of political parties. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) hold that a "party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office" (pg. 2). Similarly, Downs (1957) and Schlesinger (1984) both hold that a party is a team or an organization that seeks to gain control of government in a duly constituted election. These definitions are fairly similar. They are inclusive of any organization that democratically competes for power. Furthermore, they are based on the rational-choice explanation that all political parties seek the same institutional goal (control of government) through the same institutional means (winning democratic competitive elections) (Schlesinger, 1984).

[1] This may seem like a tautological argument, but in the finding there was no perfect relationship between self-identified political ideologies and the policies adopted by the parties. In other words, there was no consistency between ideology and progressive policies.

[2] A potential reason for this finding is that progressive issues, like gender equality, may not be mainstream among voters, therefore they may select party leaders that do not support progressive policies. A good example of this is the success of Proposition 8 banning limiting the definition of marriage in California. This initiative received support from a majority of voters via democratic means, which shows that democratic means do not always lead to progressive policies.

In this paper, I explore the role of political parties in a democracy and the effects that internal party processes have in shaping party policy. Specifically, I conduct exploratory research into the conditions within party structure and processes that correlate with the adoption of pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies.

- **Pro-poor** is often used as a catch-all term to label national policies that stimulate economic growth for the benefit of poor people as well as other sectors of the population. Some political parties define pro-poor policies as policies that target overall growth in the economy, which would benefit all including the poor, while other parties have a more nuanced approach and refer to pro-poor policies as targeted efforts to increase economic growth or improve wellbeing among poor people specifically. The former approach to pro-poor policies tends to be more market-oriented and calls for low levels of government involvement in the economy. Alternatively, the latter definition tends to call for active government involvement and may not always favor market-oriented solutions. Instead, these solutions may be, for lack of a better term, 'state-led' and based on increasing public services, instead of economic growth that is not formally channeled to the poor. Due to the amorphous nature of the term 'pro-poor,' it is not a term that is useful in research like the one being conducted in the present paper; it would be difficult to even identify what is *not* a pro-poor policy. Thus, for this paper, I adopt the definition of pro-poor that calls for targeting of resources to address the economic and social situation of the poor.[3]

- **Pro-women** policies recognize and attempt to address the historic discrimination against women in politics, the economy, and the public sphere in general. For a party to be labeled pro-women[4] it must demonstrate that it is taking into account the special economic, social, political, health, and security needs of women and actively working to address them.

- Finally, **conflict-sensitive** policies try to promote equal treatment of all ethnic or racial groups within a country, or promote a concept of peace that promotes social justice for all.

I conduct an exploratory research project – henceforth, the pilot project – that compares internal conditions and processes with the policy positions of 38 parties in 11 countries.[5] The data on internal conditions and processes was collected by International IDEA via its *Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* project and housed in an extensive database accessible on-line. The data is in narrative form and had to be coded for the pilot project. Data for party policy positions was gathered by the author from party platforms, values declarations, mission/vision statements, discussions in the legislature, and similar documents. When these documents were

[3] This method may seem to favor parties who self-identify as left-of-center; however, as seen below, there is no perfect correlation between party ideology and pro-poor policies. The data shows that parties who self-identify themselves as left-of-center do not always support pro-poor policies, nor that conservative parties are unsupportive of pro-poor initiatives. For example, 50 percent of conservative parties were found to support pro-poor policies, as defined above. Thus, the adoption of pro-poor policies is shaped by many factors, including political ideology, and this last factor is far from a perfect indicator of policy choice by either a liberal or a conservative party.

[4] I use the term *"pro-women"* to indicate policies that address the special needs of women: health, violence, economic, education, political, legal, and civil.

[5] Five from Latin America and six from the Southern Africa Development Community. The data available and the sample design is a key constraint of the pilot project. Both the IDEA database and the policy information that I managed to get from the party websites and regional reports resulted in a limited sample. This caused some large parties to be excluded, some minor ones included and some countries with many parties to be partially represented in the pilot project. For the purposes of this exploratory analysis this issue is not an altogether important problem, since the unit of analysis is the party – regardless of its size or effectiveness at winning elections. The traits that lead small parties to adopt certain policies are as valid as those that lead larger parties to adopt their own set of policies. The pilot project is looking for correlations between internal factors and policies among ALL parties, not just the large ones. The imperfections in the sample size and design need to be addressed by the more systematic research project, but these are not issues that weaken the pilot project's aim of providing an initial insight into the relationship between political party processes and conditions and the policies they adopt.

not available, I relied on reports by think-tanks, academic institutions, or multilateral organizations. Below, I provide more insight into the research design and methodology.

I divide this report into three parts. *First* I review the literature on democracy and the role of parties in a democracy, and I argue that parties are an essential component for a well functioning representative democracy. I distinguish between representative democracy and other forms of democracies that do not meet the theoretical conditions or functions of a representative democracy. I then provide an insight into the role of political parties in a democracy, detailing what their *ideal* functions ought to be to support robust representative democracy. To this end, I distinguish between programmatic and clientelist parties. I claim that clientelist parties weaken democratic governance, transparency, representation, and accountability.

The *second* section presents the pilot project. In this section I provide more details about the nature of the pilot project, the cases selected, the IDEA database, and the methodology used to collect the policy data.

The *concluding* section provides an analysis of the results. I present three key recommendations to advance the study of these issues: The first calls for a larger, more systematic research project that leverages and builds upon the experience and results of the pilot project, but that can make use of the entire IDEA database to improve the sample design. The report also recommends that any efforts to promote progressive policies need to focus primarily on political leaders, as these play an essential part in shaping voters' political interests and actually passing policies. Lastly, the paper calls for the promotion of programmatic parties, as these are more likely to support and promote progressive policies.

3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

There are many definitions and conceptualizations of *democracy*. The vast majority of political theorists and policy makers use a minimalist definition of democracy, which highlights the centrality of free and fair elections between political rivals in the quest to gain political power (Schumpeter, 1942; Przeworski, 1992; Zakaria,1997). These researchers and policy makers by no means limit their conception of a well functioning democracy to only elections – they also argue that democracy should include liberal principles and institutions. However, they believe these other traits go beyond the fundamental essence of democracy, which is the competition for power via free and fair elections. Huntington (1993) and Przeworski (1999) economically summarize democracy not as a political system that ensures freedoms, equality, or even representation, but rather as a political system that only solves the problem of tyranny. In other words, it gives voters the power to select political leaders, but if those leaders do not satisfy the needs of voters, then voters can vote them out of power and select new representatives. The point to take away from this conceptualization is that democracy allows people to select among a set of political rivals, but it does not ensure how effective the winner of election will be.

Robert Dahl's (1971) work on democratic transition provides a cogent two-dimensional model that highlights the essence of democracies in the real world. First, he does not call political systems democracies but rather 'polyarchies,' since no political system for him approaches how a true democracy should function. Dahl's model measures the level of public participation in a political system (horizontal axis) and the level of public contestation (vertical axis). A polyarchy is a political system that allows different socio-economic-regional cleavages to organize into parties, which then compete via free and fair elections.

Figure1: Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization[6]



Dahl's model draws attention to the fundamental roles of political parties and voters in a democracy, which merit further exploration here. The issue of individuals' political participation in a democracy is of paramount importance. The essence of representative democracy is the notion that voters shape the political agenda by communicating their interests to political representatives via various forms of political participation. Voting is the type of political participation that gets the most attention from scholars and policy makers because it is the form of political participation that is most widely practiced by citizens in a democratic political system, and it is the one that determines which political factions legitimately set the political program.

Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) define political participation as "acts by private individuals that are more or less directly aimed at influencing government decisions by selecting representatives, communicating and demonstrating support or opposition for issues, and keeping representatives accountable" (p. 46). This conceptualization includes formal political practices that are overtly aimed at shaping politics, such as voting, supporting campaigns, participating in protests, signing petitions, joining interest groups, contacting representatives, and so on (Putnam, 2000; Aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957; Lijphart, 1997; Cox, 1997). This definition can also include extraordinary modes of political activities, especially those outside the *system*, such as violent protests, coercion, and terrorism, but they exclude 'ceremonial' participation or civic engagement with no direct influence on politics, such as marching in parades, working on community projects, or joining government sponsored groups like youth groups or PTAs.

Political parties are the other set of actors that characterize a democracy. As discussed above, a party is "any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office" (Mainwaring and Scully,1995: 2). There are certain functions associated with well functioning political parties: "To a great extent, political parties, in theory ought to advance political pluralism, enhance citizen participation in political process, broaden the representation of different political opinions and ideologies in the governance process, ensure the peaceful and democratic transfer of political power at both national and local/community levels, enhance the accountability of governments, and give the necessary legitimacy to both the government of the day and the political system as a whole" (Matlosa, 2007: 21). Canton (2007: 5) summarizes all these roles into four key functions of political parties:

[6] Dahl, 1971: pg. 7

1. to develop policies and programs
2. to pick up demands from society and bundle them into different (policy) options
3. to recruit and select people for executive and legislative positions, and
4. to exercise control over government

These four key functions simply reaffirm the notion that political parties and voters are the essential components of a democracy.

Our definition of political participation and our conceptualization of political parties and their functions in a democracy assumes that, in addition to voters trying to communicate to political parties their interests via political participation, political parties are *receptive* to voters. Much of the literature on party-voter linkages is dominated by the *responsible party model* that presupposes that politics is the result of the interaction of parties which act as agents on behalf of voters (principals), who provide parties with the authority to govern and act on their part or toward a common good (Downs, 1957; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Chandra, 2005; and Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

The Downsian (1957) spatial theory of elections exemplifies the *responsible party model*. Downs' model assumes that voters have discrete policy preferences, which determine voters' party partiality when they vote for the party/candidate that best fits/represents their own position. The model assumes that parties "adopt issue positions that maximize their electoral support" (Iversen, 1994: p 157). In other words, vote-mixing parties try to gain office by presenting political programs and policies favored by large segments of the population. Political parties in this model compete by presenting the most attractive political program.[7]

Similarly, Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) classic study of social cleavages and party systems also relies on the *responsible party model*. For them, there are a number of social cleavages that exist within a society. These cleavages can be ethnic, territorial, moral, or class, among others (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Chandra, 2005). Their sociological approach to party-system formation argues that the most important cleavages in a society give rise to formal political parties that organize around particular cleavages and mobilize their supporters. In other words, parties "are conglomerates of groups differing on wide ranges of issues, but still united in their greater hostility to their competitors in the other camps" (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: p. 6).

Like the Downsian approach, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that political parties present ideological or programmatic appeals to attract voters. These appeals could be based on territorial, class, ethnic, or lingual issues. Moreover, they argue that regardless of the structure of the polity or the cleavages in a society, political parties are agents for clarifying conflicts and group interests and for mobilizing people into politics (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: pg. 4). Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Downs (1957), and Chandra (2005) also claim that political parties help mobilize the electorate. Parties present a clear political ideology that encourages the formation of groups that are attracted to and mobilized by the party.

Ethnic parties are a clear example of how political parties can mobilize people based on a particular ideology (Horowitz, 1985; Chandra, 2005). "An *ethnic party* appeals to voters as the champion of the interests of one ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and makes such an appeal central to its mobilizing strategy" (Chandra, 2005: 236). In political systems where ethnic cleavages are dominant, parties try to outbid each other, creating an ex-

[7] Mainwaring and Scully (1995) hold that a "party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office" (pg. 2). Similarly, Downs (1957) and Schlesinger (1984) define a party as a team or an organization that seeks to gain control of government in a duly constituted election. These definitions are fairly similar. They are inclusive of any organization that democratically competes for power. Furthermore, they are point to the rational-choice behavior that all political parties seek the same institutional goal (control of government) through the same institutional means (winning democratic competitive elections) (Schlesinger, 1984), and adopt the policy recipe that they believe resonates best with voters.

tremely volatile situation (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Horowitz, 1985; Chandra, 2005). Like the spatial models developed by Downs, theories of ethnic parties clearly leverage the principles of the *responsible party model* and embody the functions of a political party. That is, political parties, by adopting a platform or a distinct ideology, are devices to group and mobilize voters to participate in elections. Political platforms and party ideology also serve as a mechanism by which voters can hold parties accountable for their performance.

Returning to the *responsible party model*, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) present five essential traits of the model: *First*, voters have preferences and views over a range of issues. *Second*, office-seeking parties or candidates bundle issues into political platforms or programs they promise to enact. *Third*, voters then compare their views with the competing party platforms and support the party with the programmatic basket most compatible with their views and preferences. *Fourth*, victorious parties, to the best of their abilities and available resources, work to realize their campaign promises and political program presented during the campaign. And *lastly*, "at the subsequent election, voters hold incumbents and opposition parties accountable for their performance during the electoral term, based upon their effort and performance" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 1-2).

These five characteristics of the *responsible party model* represents an ideal-type representative democracy in which programmatic appeals are formed by parties and presented to voters. Voters can then elect representatives that best represent their preferences, monitor their performance, and either reward them by re-electing them or punish them by electing the opposition (O'Donnell, 1987 & 1994; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). These five traits of the *responsible party model* also show the importance of voters and political parties in the democratic process to ensure that voters' interests are communicated to the parties, that parties present political programs that represent and articulate voters' interests, and that voters hold parties accountable for their performance.

Political Clientelism

Despite wide use and support in the political science literature, the principles of the *responsible party model* ignore many of the actual practices that political parties engage in that can be considered un-democratic. In particular, it ignores the *patronage-based* party-voter linkages that exist in many democracies: "In many political systems citizen-politician linkages are based [not on programmatic appeals, but rather] on direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups of citizens whom politicians know to be highly responsive to such side-payments and willing to surrender their vote" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 2). These patronage relationships can be considered political clientelism. *Political clientelism* is the giving out of material benefits (money, jobs, food, favors, contracts, and so on) by political *patrons* (office holders, candidates, or local political brokers[8]) in exchange for the political support of the *client* (citizens who receive these benefits) in the form of political activism (attending campaign/party activities, voting, or displaying party paraphernalia at home or in one's vehicle) (Gay, 1990: 648; Auyero, 2000: 57; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 7). Heredia goes further and defines clientelism as a formalized system of exchange based on "complex rules and practices for the organization, representation, and control of the demands and interests of society; these relationships are based on political subordination in exchange for the discretionary granting of available public resources and services" (Heredia, 1997: 4 sited in Garcia-Guadilla and Perez, 2002: 93-96). Heredia points to the premeditated and structured makeup of political clientelism. It is a relationship that is deliberate and sustained by a series of political and social networks that

[8] I use the term *Political Broker* to denote a local or neighborhood boss who is affiliated with a political party and acts as a middle-person between a political party and the people in a neighborhood or town. Usually, these are people on the payroll of political parties, but may not have an explicit party title or role; they can be a party activist/leader to a community activist with no obvert political links, except during the campaign period. These brokers develop and maintain the political networks that help distribute goods to party supporters, monitor *clients'* actions, and recruit new members, and is responsible to reports back to the party the amount of support the party can count on in that broker's area (Auyero, 2000; Fieldwork notes, 2008).

identifies the political patrons and their local lieutenant/brokers, on the one hand, and the political clients on the other. In other words, political clientelism is not an *ad hoc* strategy adopted by parties to gain the upper hand, but rather a political approach that functions through a well established political and social infrastructure (Roniger, 1987; O'Donnell, 1994; Auyero, 2000; Garcia-Guadilla and Perez, 2002; Brusco, et al, 2004; Nichter, 2008).

In a democracy, all political parties make assumptions as to voters' preferences and they target benefits to particular groups of voters. So what makes a campaign appeal clientelist or programmatic? In a programmatic party system, political parties follow, more or less, the *responsible party model*. Parties announce a political program, implement policies that benefit some and hurt others, but they do this "without verifying that the beneficiaries will actually deliver their votes. Programmatic linkage therefore directs benefits at very large groups in which only a fraction of the members may actually support the candidate" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 10). The key trait of programmatic appeals is that parties enter a *non-contingent and indirect* exchange that may benefit non-supporters as much as supporters.

Political clientelism, however, is the direct and conditioned exchange of material benefits from political patrons to the political clients who provide the patron with political support. In clientelism, the benefits of the exchange are *contingent* on the actions of both the patrons and clients. In other words, "the politician's delivery of a good is *contingent upon* the actions of specific members of the electorate" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 10). Politicians target material benefits *only* to individuals who fulfill their end of the bargain and deliver or promise to deliver political support to the political patron. Voters, in turn, reserve their support to parties that provide or promise to deliver goods and services *only* to them. "Thus it is the contingency of targeted benefits, not the targeting of goods taken by itself, that constitutes the clientelist exchange" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 10).

When trying to determine whether a party appeal is clientelist or programmatic, another good gauge is the nature of the goods. *Private goods* are those that can be accrued by and only benefit individual citizens. The politicized allocation of private goods – such as the distribution of jobs, promotions, contracts, or even privileged access to public services (education, health care, public housing, welfare aid, etc) – is a strong indicator of clientelist relationship (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 11; Milne, 1973). *Public goods*, however, are goods that benefit all without the possibility of excluding individuals or groups that may not have contributed to the production of the good. These goods are not subject to clientelist exchange, as they cannot be denied to any voter, regardless of their political behavior.

Lastly, *club goods* are somewhere in between private and public goods. These are goods that benefit groups of people, but exclude those outside the group. "Citizens external to certain group boundaries can be excluded from the enjoyment of such benefits, but none of those inside the boundary" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 11). Political parties use club goods to solidify their support within particular groups or increase their supporters. A good example of a club good is a subsidy to a particular sector, e.g., taxi drivers, milk farmers, artists, teachers.

Club goods can be used in either clientelist exchanges or programmatic relations. If club goods are used in clientelist exchanges, then clientelist parties "prefer rules and regulations for the authoritative allocation of costs and benefits that leave maximum political discretion to the implementation phase, i.e., have as few precise rules of disbursement and entitlement as possible" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 12). These parties can then identify particular individuals or small groups whose support can be obtained by providing some directly targeted and tailored club good. If a party is programmatic, then it would prefer clear and general rules to allot club goods to individuals who fulfill the stipulated requirements regardless of their political behavior or affiliation. Thus, *clientelist parties seek distribution rules that provide them with the greatest discretion to target club goods to voters whose support they want to win, while programmatic parties seek rule based disbursement procedures that takes the power away from individual politicians.*

Table 1: Clientelist and Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages		
	Strategic Linkages	
	Clientelist	**Programmatic**
Party targets goods to voters	***Yes*** to individuals and small groups	***Yes*** to large groups or entire electorate
Nature of goods offered	Private and restricted club goods	Public and rule-based club goods
Contingency of benefits	***Yes*** benefits contingent on voters' action	***No*** no contingencies
Use of enforcement/monitoring network	***Yes*** extensive use of monitoring and enforcement networks	***No***
Predictability of support/compliance by voters	***High***	***Variable*** (Low to Medium)

Clientelist transactions are maintained through complex political networks that create webs of exchange, obligation and reciprocity (Auyero, 2000). These networks maintain an on-going series of exchanges that facilitate effective clientelist transactions in which patrons can choose to punish or reward the actions of the client. If the client fulfilled his end of the bargain, it is likely that the patron will continue rewarding the client, and vice versa. Thus, clientelist relations become more valuable to politicians "if they can be withdrawn if the voter does not keep up his end or her end of the bargain" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 20).

To ensure that clients satisfy their commitments, patrons invest in monitoring infrastructure. Programmatic parties do not need to invest in monitoring infrastructure, as their appeals are for public or club goods that would benefit all voters regardless of their individual political choices. In clientelist relations, the local brokers play the most important role in monitoring. They ensure that those who continue receiving benefits are those who deliver their political support (the vote, time at party meeting or campaign activity) to the party. Accordingly, the on-going nature of clientelist exchange and the ability to punish clients who do not provide the agreed upon support, increases the effectiveness of political patrons in mobilizing voters.

Table I (above) shows a few salient differences between clientelist and programmatic party-voter linkages. The heuristic value of this table is to clarify the major differences between programmatic and clientelist parties. It summarizes the points discussed above regarding the two types of party-voter linkages.

Political Clientelism and Democratic Accountability

There is a debate as to whether political clientelism is good or bad for democracy. On the one hand, political clientelism is a party-voter linkage that has a high probability of mobilizing voters to participate. Since individuals' participation in politics is the cornerstone of democracy, then more people participating in politics may benefit the system (Kitschelt 2000; Scott 1969; Brusco, et al, 2004). The definition of political participation offered so far highlights the importance of political participation as a way for individuals to communicate and to demonstrate support for, or opposition to, issues while keeping political representatives accountable. Does clientelist-inspired participation fit our conception of political participation? To address this question we should determine if political clients are communicating any messages to political leaders

about the issues or policies they support or oppose. Given that clientelist parties mobilize people through the direct exchange of private or club goods and not general policy promises that will benefit the entire economy or society, then it can be argued that clients are participating or supporting their political patrons for the material benefits, not because they support the political program presented by the clientelist party (Lyne, 2007: 166).

In many cases, political brokers tell voters which rallies to attend and for whom to vote regardless of the clients' political preferences. These voters are not providing their support as citizens who support a certain political program, but rather as clients who are mobilized in exchange for a bag of food, money, jobs, or the promise of future benefits. Under clientelist exchanges voters are not supporting any political initiatives that would benefit the entire electorate, but rather engaging in an economic transaction with no political intention (*ibid*, 164). Thus, clientelist-inspired mobilization cannot be considered democratic political participation, but a sort of social/economic transaction between patrons and clients, where patrons purchase the support of clients with material benefits, not programmatic appeals.

Other scholars see clientelist networks as a poor country's 'welfare service.' As seen in many accounts of political clientelism, the political network that sustains the patron-client relationship is viewed positively by people within the system. Local brokers are seen as community leaders who help local people access resources that they would otherwise have no way of accessing. Political brokers are the conduits by which demands, favors, goods and services flow to and from political patrons and clients, and voters see these clientelist relationships as a positive and efficient way of accessing resources (Auyero, 2000; Roniger, 1987; Brusco, et al, 2004). However, political clientelism is clearly a form of social and political control. If voters do not satisfy their end of the bargain, the same brokers who facilitate access to resources can obstruct non- or delinquent clients from accessing these resources.

According to Medina and Stokes, "clientelist mobilization works best on voters who are poor" (Medina and Stokes 2007: 73). Because of this "symbiosis between clientelism and poverty," clientelist parties have a vested interest in maintaining a high degree of poverty. Improvements in voters' socio-economic status erode the value of clientelist appeals. As voters become better off, "the risk-reducing credit arrangements that the local patron makes available to clients, for instance, are replaced by private credit institutions that maximize their profits by considering all customers, independent of their political loyalties" (*ibid*, 74). So the value of clientelist appeals is further reduced. As a result, clientelist parties may provide material benefits to clients that seem to be a form of welfare service, but the reality is that these parties are not interested in reducing poverty, but rather in maintaining clients as poor, dependent, and obliged to their political patrons.

What about democratic accountability? The *responsible party model* presents an ideal type of representative democracy where political parties compete by presenting alternative programs to voters. Voters choose the one that best aligns with their social, economic, and political views and preferences and the party that gathers a majority of votes is able to implement its program. At the end of the term, the process starts again, with the party in power held accountable for its performance while in office (retrospective voting – see Fiorina, 1981).

There may not be any political system that satisfies all facets of an ideal representative democracy, but in political systems where political parties rely more on clientelist appeals rather than programs that are openly debated and voted on, the nature of democratic representativeness and accountability is tremendously reduced. In a clientelist system, voters do not hold parties accountable for their performance, but instead support patrons who provide them with the highest payoff. Voters actually forgo the ability to pass judgment on party platforms or performance – they lose their ability to voice support or opposition for any type of policy change!

Political parties act to weaken institutions[9] that can check their power once in power and divide the government's resources in *tributes¸ patronage*, *and prebends*. Tributes are the traditional gifts that patrons give away to clients. Patronage "can be defined as the practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services for political clienteles." A prebend is when "an individual is given a public office in order for him/her to gain personal access over state resources" (Van de Walle, 2007: 51).

In other words, clientelist parties create an institutional setting similar to what O'Donnell calls a *delegative democracy* (DD). In a DD whoever gains power via legitimate elections "is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office" (O'Donnell, 1994: 59). Like in clientelist dominated political systems, in a DD parties in power implement policies that "need bear no resemblance to" campaign promises. They govern as they see fit without any need to ensure representation of the public's interests. It is standard practice "that resistance – be it from congress, (other) political parties, interest groups, or crowds in the streets – has to be ignored" (O'Donnell, 1994: 61). For O'Donnell, clientelism and DD are intertwined. They work together to ensure no horizontal accountability, "controls that state agencies are supposed to exercise over other state agencies," or vertical accountability, when voters can hold parties accountable for how they have governed (O'Donnell, 1996: 43). Thus, political clientelism is detrimental to the development of a representative democracy that is accountable to voters and takes their interests into consideration when formulating political programs and policies.

The study of political parties is essential to the study of democracy. Parties serve as the primary link between voters and the government. If parties adhere to the principle of the *responsible party model* they can foster democratic governance and ensure that the government is responsive to the public's needs. However, if political parties turn away from programmatic appeals and resort to clientelist tactics to mobilize people, then despite the existence of elections within a clientelist political system, representative democracy has little chance of flourishing. Instead of representative democracy where parties aggregate, articulate, and represent the public's interest in the decision-making process, clientelist parties will pursue their own self-interests, they will not be accountable to voters, and the effectiveness of the state in implementing any program will be severely limited.

Programmatic Parties

Programmatic parties are parties which advocate a "particular position on issues of broad public concern rather than rooted in machine based or clientelist strategies or charisma of individual leaders" (Keefer, 2005:1). These parties present a political platform or set of principles that provide the public with a sense of the policies the party would pursue if elected. Platforms also provide a yardstick by which voters can hold parties accountable. Programmatic parties are the ideal-type assumed by the *responsible party model*.

The literature on political parties identifies three major determinants of programmatic parties. First is the nation's income level, then historical factors, and finally, the quality of bureaucracy. The first argues that as voters' income levels increase, their vulnerability to clientelist appeals decreases. Therefore, in more affluent societies we should expect more programmatic parties. The second condition is the historical traditions of a party. Shefter (1994) argues that there is a significant path dependency as to whether a party is programmatic or clientelist. Once parties adopt a strategy, whether it be clientelist or programmatic, they are locked in and the public's expectation of continued behavior reinforces this strategy. This historical legacy argument holds that voters expect parties to continue a particular strategy, which then compels the party

[9] Clientelist parties weaken democratic institutions that may check the power and arbitrariness of the party in power, and that may aggregate voters' interests and present these to political leaders to act. Clientelist parties claim to be the legitimate representative of the people and therefore overemphasize the importance of "elections", because via elections they are able to gain unquestioned control of the government and its resources. Thus, in clientelist political systems we should expect to find weak "checks-and-balances", strong executive office, and highly competitive elections with emphasis on transparency.

to continue said strategy if they want to continue getting the public's support (Keefer, 2005; Van de Walle, 2003; Shefter, 1994). Lastly, the literature also points out that in political systems where the civil service is based on a meritocracy, it is less likely that clientelism will pervade: "Where bureaucracies are independent and well-functioning, and would resist the implementation of arbitrary, clientelist policies [as in Bismarck's Germany, or the British civil service examination process], new political parties are compelled to shape programmatic appeals to voters" (Keefer, 2005: 4; see also Shefer, 1994; Chandra, 2004; and Kohli, 2004). Kohli's (2004) account of the development of the civil service in India and Nigeria provides an interesting example of how an autonomous bureaucracy limited patronage in India, but a lack of non-politicized procedures and procurement processes created a Nigerian bureaucracy characterized by patronage, extreme corruption and inefficiency. The Indian and Nigerian cases are interesting, as they had the same colonial ruler, Great Britain. In India the British established a rigorous meritocracy in the civil service, which reduced corruption, while in Nigeria no such structures were established. As a result, after independence there was no history of civil service exams or apolitical/independent hiring processes.

The role of political and electoral institutions in promoting programmatic parties has received mixed reviews. According to Keefer (2005), many researchers see institutions as being dependent on the parties. If clientelism is prevalent in a political party system, then "politicians shape electoral rules to facilitate clientelist transfers" (ibid, p. 6). Argentina and the Dominican Republic cogently demonstrate this point. These two countries have widely recognized clientelist political party systems (Brusco, et al, 2004; Auyero, 2000; Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008 & 2009). In both countries the major parties pushed through electoral reforms to facilitate the monitoring of voter behavior. For example, in both countries party representatives can be present in the polling stations and observe who votes – not how they vote, but who votes. This allows party representatives to ensure that their clients fulfill their part of the bargain and actually turn out to vote (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008 & 2009; Nichter, 2008). Thus, the endogeneity of political and electoral institutions cannot be a good measure of whether a party is programmatic or clientelist, but rather it is part of the historical legacy argument.

In his own analysis, Keefer (2005) argues that party reputation and the competitive environment are the key factors in determining whether parties are programmatic. "The age of the main government party is a significant predictor of whether it is programmatic, and the age of both the main opposition and government parties are significant predictors of whether both the main opposition and government parties are programmatic… [Moreover], the presence of programmatic opposition party spurs the selection of more programmatic government parties" (ibid, p. 20). In other words, once a party has been established for a long time, it is likely that it will be more programmatic. Similarly, if parties are competing against programmatic parties, it is also more likely that they will also be programmatic. However, this means that if opposition parties are clientelist, the government party is also likely to be clientelist.

Lastly, the importance of programmatic parties is that they have a significant effect on public policies. From the discussion above, clientelist parties tend to support policies that promote private and club goods for their supporters. These policies lessen the focus on policies that support increasing public goods and the quality of government, such as bureaucratic quality, rule of law, school enrollment, and market share of non-state owned media and industry. Keefer (2005) finds that "programmatic parties have a significant *positive* effect on bureaucratic quality, as well as on other non-targeted goods" such as primary school enrolment and freedom of information. "Corruption is significantly lower in the presence of programmatic parties as is targeted spending on public investment," two measures of targeted policies (Keefer, 2005: 28-29). In all, Keefer (2005) finds sufficient results to support the claim that programmatic political parties have a significant positive effect on government policies that promote non-targeted goods and increase state capacity. Thus, in addition to promoting democratic governance, transparency, accountability, and representation, programmatic parties also promote public policies that promote public goods.

4. PILOT PROJECT: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROGRESSIVE POLICIES

The pilot project is designed to address two key questions: *First*, how can the IDEA database be leveraged to study political parties and the policies they adopt? *Second*, what internal conditions and processes of parties may influence the incentives and the capacity of parties to engage in policy making, particularly the ability of parties to adopt pro-women, pro-poor, and conflict-sensitive policies?

This section begins to answer the second question. The intention of the pilot project is *not* to find statistically robust findings or claim any solid causal relations that lead parties to adopt pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies; instead the goal of the pilot project is to provide a descriptive or qualitative analysis to begin to understand the internal conditions that may promote parties to support pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies. The initial findings can then be used to shape a more systematic study of these issues.

Methodology – Data Collection

The pilot project is a small-N (small number of cases) study that leverages the descriptive data captured in IDEA's *Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* database. IDEA collected data on political parties via three questionnaires covering:

1. *The external environment* – the regulatory, financial, political and electoral spheres in which political parties grow and function.

2. *The internal functioning of parties* – the way in which parties themselves choose to organize and fund themselves, select candidates for political office, formulate policy and party programs, which influences how parties relates to their constituencies, grow and function.

3. *Country context* – GDP/capita, party competition, demographic data.

This pilot project makes use of the data captured via the second questionnaire, the internal functioning of parties. The database provides information about the internal conditions and processes of parties in a narrative form. Many variables have extensive data which reference party constitutions or national law. Other variables provide succinct answers. In all, the database provides the information for our independent (explanatory) variables.

The first step was reviewing information in the database and selecting the key variables. Table II contains the list of 23 independent variables used in the analysis. These variables cover a wide range of the internal characteristics of a party: from ideological stance, to internal (s)election of candidates, to political program/manifesto, and so on. These variables were chosen after reviewing a series of UNDP, IDEA, and IDASA reports on political parties and the policies they have adopted.

For example, the bulk of the literature on political parties claims that undemocratic internal processes lead to oligarchic tendencies in the policies promoted by the party. That is, an "embedded internal culture of the bureaucratic-oligarchic syndrome" can lead to the failure of political parties turning the public's interests and demands into policies and laws (Matlosa, 2007: 24). This means that we should expect to find parties that are more democratic in electing leaders and/or that provide mechanisms by which members can communicate their interests to party leadership adopting policies that better represent the public's needs.

Table 2: List of Independent Variables – Internal Data

Variable Name	Description
Party_Label	5. How does your party describe itself
Party_Constituency	8. Which constituency or socio-economic group does/did the party's founders claim(ed) to represent?
Nat_Executive_Selection_Rules	12.a. Are there written rules and procedures for the regular s/election of members of the national executive body in the party?
Nat_Exec_Selection_Elected	12.b. By whom are they elected or appointed?
Nat_Exec_Election_Process	12.c. If elected, how?
Nat_Exec_Quota	12.d. Are there formal internal party quotas for women on this body?
Nat_Exec_PwrDistribution	13. Is there a written mandate (duties) for the national/highest executive body above and/or distribution of power/tasks within the party leadership?
Party_Pres_Selection_Rules	20. What, if any, written rules govern the s/election of the party president?
Ethics_Rules	21. What, if any, formal process exists to monitor and regulate the ethical behavior of political party officials?
Policy_Program	23. How does the party decide on its policy program document, if it has one?
Accountability_Leadership	26. How, if at all, can the party leadership be held accountable for not following party policy decisions?
Communication_Member	36. How often, if at all, do members communicate with the party?
Communication_Guidelines	37. Which, if any, formal and written guidelines provide party members with an opportunity to express their opinions on party matters?
Candidate_Process_Pres	42. What is the process for s/election of party candidates for presidential elections?
Candidate_Process_Legislature1	44. What are the party rules for the process by which candidates to chamber 1 of the national legislature are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election?
Party_Electoral_System	48. What electoral system, if any, is used within the party to s/elect its candidates?
Candidate_Quota	49. What, if any, is the quota voluntarily (not required by law) adopted by the party that a certain number or percentage of candidates for nomination will be women?
Women_Incentives	50. What, if any other, special measures have been adopted by the party to ensure that women are nominated in elections?
Term_Limits	54. What, if any, are the limits on the number of times a candidate can hold an elected office on behalf of the political party?
Manifesto	57. What is the process of preparing the party election manifestos?
Campaign_Strategy	58. Is there a process of working out campaign strategy/operational plan?
Media_Outlets	70. What, if any, media outlets are owned by the party or party leadership, nationally or locally?
Campaign_Finance	73. How is funding for campaign purposes distributed within the party?

Once the independent variables were selected, the next step was to select the countries and parties under consideration. I selected 11 countries - six countries from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and five from Latin America. These countries were selected because they were the countries included in the database that represented their respective regions. The regions were selected based on their wide range of political party systems: most of the SADCs countries are known to have a dominant party model, while Latin American countries are known for their multi-party system. This is a limited sample of countries that leverages only a handful of the countries included in the IDEA database. The systematic research project that follows this pilot project can expand its efforts and include a more diverse group of countries.

The parties for which I was able to find policy data – via the party's political programs/manifestos, party constitution, declaration of policy principles, and also regional policy reports – were selected for the study. Combining the parties in the database with the information I was able to find resulted in 38 parties being selected for the pilot project. This is far from an ideal form of selecting units for a sample, but since the intention of the pilot project is to provide an initial view and only identify correlations between our independent variables and policy stances, this imperfect sample will allow for an exploratory analysis of the data contained in the IDEA database and how it can be used to identify the conditions that lead political parties to adopt progressive policies. Table III lists the countries and parties under current consideration.

Once I had the policy information for the parties, I combined this information with the data in the IDEA database. Parties that demonstrated a commitment to poverty reduction by channeling resources to the poor and working class via welfare programs, job-creation programs, or regulatory efforts that compelled private sector to invest in poor areas were categorized as pro-poor. Parties that claimed to pursue an orthodox pro-growth strategy to reducing poverty, but did not explicitly target resources to poverty-alleviation, were not labeled pro-poor. Parties that demonstrated an understanding of the economic, political, cultural, health, and security needs and challenges of women were found to be pursuing pro-women policies. For example, to be labeled pro-women, parties had to show they supported issues such as the elimination of all forms of discrimination and violence against women in all facets of public and private life, promote women's role in non-traditional education and work areas, and promote women's health issues beyond pregnancy/maternity health (e.g., cervical and breast cancer, access to contraceptives).

Finally, parties that recognized internal cultural, ethnic, or economic differences and called for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against historically marginalized groups, or called for a non-violent end to conflict were found to be conflict-sensitive. This characterization excludes parties that labeled all citizens as equal or a member of the nation, as a unitary national identity can be used as a form of oppression and discrimination (e.g, the contributions of non-whites in LAC are systematically excluded from historical and cultural accounts in order to promote a more Iberian-centered identity). Again, relying on documents from the parties and on secondary policy reports, I was able to find information for the 38 parties included in the pilot program.

Table 3: List of Countries and Parties

Country, Party	Country, Party	Country, Party
Lesotho, BAC	South Africa, ANC	Colombia, Cambio Radical
Lesotho, BNP	South Africa, DA	Colombia, Equipo
Lesotho, LCD	South Africa, IFP	Colombia, Partido Conservador
Lesotho, NIP	South Africa, UDM	Colombia, Partido Liberal
Lesotho, PFD	South Africa, ACDP	Colombia, Polo Democratico
Malawi, UDF	Zambia, UNIP	Ecuador, ID
Malawi, Congress Party	Zambia, UPND	Ecuador, PK
Mauritius, MMM	Zambia, MMD	Peru, APRA
Mauritius, MSM	Bolivia, AND	Peru, Somos Peru
Namibia, DTA	Bolivia, MAS	Peru, UPP
Namibia, SWAPO	Bolivia, MNR	Venezuela, MVR
Namibia, NUDO	Bolivia, UN	Venezuela, PPT
Namibia, MAG		Venezuela, PJ

Methodology – Data Analysis Plan

I grouped parties by a given policy, such as whether they were pro-poor, pro-women, or conflict-sensitive. Then I used the Method of Difference and the Method of Agreement[10] to see if there were any interesting differences in the internal conditions. Since this is an exploratory preliminary analysis to help identify potential conditions that correlate with pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies, this descriptive method works well. While not statistically valid, the results of the Methods of Difference and Agreement can provide insights into potential causal relations which can be further studied in a more systematic research effort. After this preliminary analysis, I then conducted a crosstab analysis, which allows us to observe whether there an independent variable correlated with one of our progressive policies.

Data Presentation – Pro-Poor Policies

Out of 38 political parties, I managed to find information about pro-poor policies for 28 of the parties. Of these, 19 were found to have explicit pro-poor policies that channeled resources to the poor and working class. The rest did not show any explicit policies targeting resources to the poor. Regionally, Latin American parties seemed to be much more pro-poor than parties in Southern Africa. The data show that the vast majority of parties in Latin America, 85.7%, proposed policies that channeled resources to the poor, while there was an even split between Southern African parties.

[10] John Stuart Mill developed the Method of Agreement and Method of Difference to study the causal relationship between two factors. The first technique, Method of Agreement, tries to identify the cause of a given effect by looking for a common factor that is present in all cases in which the effect occurs. The method of difference, for its part, is a second test to determine whether a given factor plays a causal role for a given effect. This method requires us to take away that factor, holding everything else constant, and to see whether the effect still occurs.

Table 4: Pro-Poor Policies

Pro-Poor Policies			
	Number of Parties		Total
	Southern Africa	Latin America	
No policies that channelled resources to the poor	7 (50%)	2 (14.3%)	9 (32.1%)
Policies which channelled resources to the poor; could be an overall state-led growth policy or pro-market	7 (50%)	12 (85.7%)	19 (67.9%)
	14 (100%)	14 (100%)	
Total	**28**		**100.0%**

So what are the conditions that correlate with pro-poor parties? Out of the 23 internal variables, five demonstrated a noteworthy trend that indicated a potential relationship between itself and the party's pro-poor policies. The results are presented in Table V.

A party's political ideology demonstrated a noteworthy link between itself and a party's policy toward the poor. 78.9% of parties that self-identified themselves as left-of-center claimed to support policies which channeled resources to the poor; these approaches could be a state-led growth policy or pro-market strategy. This percentage is significantly higher than the 50% of parties that self-identified themselves as right-of-center that claimed to supported pro-poor policies. Thus, a left-leaning political identity was a good indicator of whether a party supported pro-poor policies.

An internal quota for women also seems to be a positive indicator of whether a party supports pro-poor policies. When a party had informal quotas for women to assume leadership positions *within* the party, 75% of these parties supported pro-poor policies. When the quotas were formal, this percentage increased to 81.8%. This is a positive indication that the more internally diverse a party leadership is, the more likely the party is to adopt pro-poor policy.

Along the same lines, when a party provides its members with mechanisms to communicate their political interests with the party, it increases the chances that that party will adopt pro-poor policies. By communication mechanisms I mean individual correspondence, petitions, and meetings open to the general membership. As can be seen in Table V, 72.7% of parties that provided its members multiple mechanisms to communicate with the party leadership had pro-poor policies, versus 60% of parties that provided only a single mechanism of communication. This difference is not large, but it provides evidence of a trend that indicates that the more communication between party members and party leadership, the more probable it is that the party will adopt policies that benefit the masses. The link between communication and pro-poor policies makes theoretical sense, as it is not unreasonable to expect people calling on their parties to address poverty issues. This is a potential example of how voters can effectively communicate their needs and political interests to their party leaders.

Paradoxically, and breaking with the claims that democratic processes within parties lead to more progressive policies, the pilot project suggests that parties with undemocratic processes for selecting candidates for internal and external elections were more likely to support pro-poor policies. This correlation between pro-poor policies and undemocratic practices in selecting candidates is further supported in the party s/election practices for the legislature. Table Vb is intended to be a supporting addendum to the evidence for the undemocratic findings shown in Table V. As can be seen in Table Vb, even at the legislative level, parties whose leadership tended to select candidates were more likely to support pro-poor policies. Despite the differ-

ence in Table Vb being quite small, combining it with that in Table V suggests that undemocratic processes are positively correlated with pro-poor parties. There is no clear explanation why this would be the case, except that party leaders simply 'buy into' pro-poor policies. Or perhaps, in order to maintain their supporters willingness to be content with undemocratic processes, party leaders simply placated voters' needs by supporting pro-poor policy. Additional qualitative research is needed tounderstand thisbetter.

Lastly, the quantity of communication that flows from a party to its voters also correlated with pro-poor policies. 90.9% of parties that owned at least a party newspaper or website had pro-poor policies, versus 50% for parties that did not own any media outlets. Additional qualitative research is needed to better understand the causal logic of this point.

Table 5: Results of Binomial Analysis – Pro-Poor Policies

Independent variables		No policies that channeled resources to the poor	Policies which channelled resources to the poor; could be an overall state-led growth policy or pro-market
5. How does your party describe itself	Social Democrat, liberal, or left-of-center	21.1%	78.9%
	Conservative, right-of-center, or religious	50.0%	50.0%
	Total	29.6%	70.4%
12.d. Are there formal internal party quotas for women on this body?	No quota	41.7%	58.3%
	Informal quota	25.0%	75.0%
	Formal quota	18.2%	81.8%
	Total	29.6%	70.4%
36. How often, if at all, do members communicate with the party?	One mechanism identified	40.0%	60.0%
	Multiple channels of communication	27.3%	72.7%
	Total	33.3%	66.7%
42. What is the process for s/election of party candidates for presidential elections?	Party leadership decides	10.0%	90.0%
	Via elections @ the local branch or in annual conference	50.0%	50.0%
	Total	34.6%	65.4%
70. What, if any, media outlets are owned by the party or party leadership, nationally or locally?	None	50.0%	50.0%
	At least has a party newspaper or website	9.1%	90.9%
	Total	32.0%	68.0%

Table 5b: Addendum to Results of Binomial Analysis – Pro-Poor Policies

Independent variables		No policies that channeled resources to the poor	Policies which channeled resources to the poor; could be an overall state-led growth policy or pro-market
44. What are the party rules for the process by which candidates to chamber 1 of the national legislature are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election?	Party leadership decides	33.3%	66.7%
	Via elections @ the local branch or in annual conference	40.0%	60.0%
	Total	36.4%	63.6%

Pro-women Policies

According to the literature on political parties and gender quotas (Htun, 2003), intra-party conditions have the potential to play a big role in the gender policies promoted bya party. For example, the literature suggests that the greater the number of women in leadership positions within a party, the more that party will focus on women's issues. The idea here is that the more diverse/representative the party leadership is, the more effective it will be at promoting the needs of its constituents; or more directly, the more women leaders within the party, the more attention that party will give to women's issues (Dador, 2006). This is one of the main arguments for quotas and other initiatives promoting the inclusion of women in party leadership.

Of the 38 political parties that make up our sample, I collected information on gender policies for 37. Table 6 provides an overview of the number of parties that were found to be pro-women. As can be seen, a larger percentage of Latin American parties were found to be more progressive than parties in SADC. 68.8% of Latin American parties were found to support initiatives to address gender equality or address the special health, economic, or security needs of women; in SADC, only 42.9% of parties were found to promote a pro-women agenda. The relatively low percentage of pro-women parties found in the SADC is quite surprising as it is a region that has made notable progress in advancing women's participation in both political parties as well as in government institutions. "It is widely accepted that this region is far ahead of other parts" of the developing world, and in fact, globally the SADC region is second only to the social democratic Scandinavian countries in respect of women's participation in parliament" (Matlosa, 2005: 44). However, the number of women representatives in parliament and within party leadership in SADC is not translating into increased focus on women's issues or promotion of women's rights within party political platforms or at the country level (Matlosa, 2005; EISA, 2008). This initial view into the regional differences between parties suggests that gender quotas may not be sufficient to promote women's rights. This point will be further discussed below.

Table 6: Gender Policies

Pro-Women			
	Number of Parties		**Total**
	Southern Africa	Latin America	
Little to no initiatives to address gender equality	12 (57.1%)	5 (31.2%)	17 (45.9%)
Significant initiatives to address gender equality	9 (42.9%)	11 (68.8%)	20 (54.1%)
	21 (100%)	16 (100%)	
Total	**37**		**100.0%**

There were more internal party conditions that had a positive association with a pro-women agenda. Table VII indicates that a total of nine independent variables showed some type of trend in relation to pro-women policies. Similar to the pro-poor policies, the analysis of question 8 shows that parties that claimed to represent the working class and poor tended to be more supportive of a pro-women agenda; for their part, parties that claimed to represent the interests of the upper class or those of a particular religious or ethnic group demonstrated a high propensity not to support pro-women policies. This means that there is a potential causal relation here. Parties that self-identified as being mass based may promote pro-women policies because women make up about half of the electorate in the countries included in the pilot project. Thus, in order to attract women to their cause they may support pro-women policies.

This thought process suggests that the more inclusive the party, the more likely it will support pro-women policies that promote women's rights. This is an initial suggestion that needs to be further studied, as there is no perfect association between the inclusiveness of parties and gender policies.

Four variables captured how open a party was to the voice of its members (questions 23, 36, 57, and 58). The latter three show a consistent association between low communication/consultation with the public and promoting a pro-women agenda. *The data show that parties with top-down, un-consultative approaches to developing the party's campaign manifestos and campaign strategies were more likely to support a pro-women agenda. Moreover, parties that had limited mechanisms by which its members can communicate with its leadership also were more likely to claim to support a pro-women agenda.* These variables show a clear trend that less communication between parties and its members is actually supportive of a pro-women agenda. Of course there may be a variety of factors at play here, and further research on this issue is needed.

This finding is further buttressed by the data presented in question 44 that captures the internal process for the (s)election of candidates to the legislature. As Table VII shows, parties where candidates were elected by party members or their delegates were less likely to adopt a pro-women agenda than parties where the party leadership selected its legislative candidates. This means, the more democratic the party, the less pro-women it is! A potential reason for this finding is that women's rights are not salient factors for party activists who tend to influence the political agenda of parties (Hirschman, 1970). In situations where men tend to be more vocal and participate more in party activities, it makes sense that democratic processes within parties may not result in policies that promote women's rights. Democracy does not always lead to progressive outcomes. More on this point will be presented in the discussion section.

The issue of gender quotas is also complex. Question 49 captures information about gender quotas for candidate nominations to external elections, e.g., legislature. The data shows that as the quota increases, the percentage of parties supporting pro-women policies also increased. At the same time, Table VIIb shows the result of the analysis of question 12d, which contains information about gender quotas for leadership positions within the party. Table VIIb essentially shows *no particular relationship between internal gender quotas and gender policies*. Parties that had no quotas actually had a higher propensity to claim support for pro-women policies than parties with informal quotas. This result suggests that the presence of women in the party leadership may not be sufficient to promote pro-women policies within a party.

The relationship between gender quotas (both internal and external) and pro-women policies deserves more attention. The logic behind quotas and pro-women policies is that the more women are part of the party-leadership and in elected positions in a country's legislature, the more importance will be given to pro-women policies within a political party. However, this logic is not always supported by empirical data. Taking Colombia as an example, one can see the complex effect that internal and external quotas have on a party's gender policies. The two largest parties in Colombia, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, both have significant differences in the electoral representation of women. The Liberal Party has a higher measure of equality in elected positions in comparison to the Conservative Party, 13.6% versus 5.66%, respectively.[11] Both parties lagged well behind the leader, *Movimiento Mira,* which had a measure of electoral equality of 65.9%. At the same time, however, the measure of organizational equality between men and women within a party was very high for both parties: the Liberal Party had a measure of 69.6% and the Conservative Party had a measure of 65.6%.[12] De-

[11] Both the liberal and conservative parties have relatively low measures of women representation in relation to some of the other political parties in Colombia. For instance, *Movimiento Mira* had a measure of 65.9%. Nonetheless, the liberal party ranks 7th out of 16 political parties in Colombia, and the conservative party ranks 14th. Such different rankings and the fact that the liberal party's measure of women representation is more than twice that of the conservative party, indicates that the liberal party, while still lagging behind other parties, is more inclusive of women than the conservative party.

[12] The equality measures for both organizational and elected positions were taken from a 2008 study ranking Colombian political parties with regard to their gender equality positions. For more information please

spite these two different positions, both parties were found to have the highest measure of gender equality in their policy programs. In other words, despite the Conservative Party's relatively low level of women representation in electoral processes and elected bodies, it promoted women's rights at the similar high rate as the Liberal Party.

Note that both the Liberal and Conservative parties were both assessed to highly promote women's rights despite lagging well behind other parties in terms of women's representation in electoral processes. Thus, this data suggests that internal equality seems to be more salient in determining a party platform than equality in elected positions. This finding is contrary to the findings in Table VII, which found a strong relationship between external quotas and pro-women policies. How can we reconcile this discrepancy? A more systematic study can clarify the true relationship between internal and external women representation and gender sensitive policies. But overall, the seeming contradiction between the case of Colombia and the data presented in Table VII shows that gender quotas can have varying degrees of importance in determining a political party´s position on gender sensitive policies.

Finally, questions 26 and 70 measure the level of oversight and party communication via the media, respectively. The analysis of these variables shows a robust correlation between higher mechanisms of accountability and pro-women policies, on one hand, and a party's ownership of at least a party paper and/or a website and pro-women policies, on the other. In other words, higher accountability of party leaders and higher capability to communicate with the public each promote a pro-women policy agenda.

Combining all these results, a very complex picture of a pro-women party emerges. But the two most interesting findings relate to the undemocratic practices and the role of quotas. As seen in Table VII and examined in the Colombian example above, there is no clear link between internal and external quotas, or level of women's representation, and pro-women policies. The case of SADC may provide further insight.

As a whole, SADC was found to have made significant progress "in advancing gender equality in politics both at the micro level or political parties and at the macro level of government institutions (especially parliament)"; however, the reality of translating these numbers into shaping the political agenda to be more pro-women is uncertain at best (Matlosa, 2005: 44). The high level of women representatives and women in party leadership positions has not heightened the importance of women's issues as a major policy area. Thus, gender quotas (when adhered to) may have an impact in terms of the number of women elected, but it is not clear from the data if there is a relationship between quotas and pro-women policies.

These narratives all imply that the simple presence of gender quotas or even high levels of female representation within party leadership do not make a pro-women agenda more likely. Both the conservative and liberal parties of Colombia have relatively low measures of women representatives in electoral processes, yet their ranking in pro-women political agendas was higher than many other political parties that had higher measures of women representatives. Thus, another factor other than gender quota may be at play in promoting a pro-women agenda.

In addition, the analysis found that parties with undemocratic processes tended to be more pro-women. This finding points to the importance of party leaders "buying into" gender equality to promote pro-women policies in the party's agenda. A potential reason why undemocratic parties tend to be pro-women is that gender equality may not be a significant factor for the majority of party activists who tend to shape their party's agenda. Since men tend to be more involved in politics,[13] it is possible that women's issues may not emerge as salient issues for the membership as a whole. In other words, if majoritarian mechanisms were the only mechanisms used to

see (Campaña Más Mujeres Más Política, 2008: "Ranking de igualdad de mujeres y hombres en los partidos y movimientos politicos colombianos").

[13] See Burns, Schlozman and Verba's (2001) landmark study of gender, equality, and political participation in which the authors find a wide range of structural (economic, social, and cultural) factors that contributed to maintaining women's interest and participation in politics at a lower level than men's.

decide the main programmatic issues of a political party, then women's issues may not emerge among the main political areas supported by voters and therefore the party. This means that unless there was a normative mandate or an explicitly enforced commitment to promote gender equality, it is likely that gender inequality may persist under democratic rules. It is also a potential reason why an undemocratic party structure that has bought into gender equality may be more effective than an internally democratic party at bridging the gender gap and giving women's issues a more prominent role in the party's political agenda.

Conflict-Sensitive Policies

The third policy area under consideration is conflict-sensitive policies, for which data was available for 20 parties. Parties were split evenly with regard to their sensitivity towards conflict. 50% percent of parties in both SADC and Latin America paid close attention to internal differences and conflicts and/or promoted peaceful solutions to any ethnic, racial, economic, or regional conflict; correspondingly, the other 50% of parties did not show any particular sensitivity to conflict or internal differences. This unusual symmetry provides an interesting opportunity to study determinants of conflict-sensitive policies.

Table 8: Conflict-Sensitive Policies

Conflict-Sensitive Policies			
	Number of Parties		**Total**
	Southern Africa	Latin America	
No attention paid to conflict or internal differences	4 (50%)	6 (50%)	10 (50%)
Demonstrated sensitivity to internal differences, conflict, and a peaceful solution to ethnic, racial, economic or regional cleavages	4 (50%)	6 (50%)	10 (50%)
	8 (100%)	12 (100%)	
Total	**20**		**100.0%**

Table 9 presents the variables that demonstrated a trend. 11 out of our 23 independent variables showed some type of association; many of these trends were also seen above in the previous analysis. Again, question 5 shows that parties that self-identified as left-of-center tended to be more progressive than conservative parties in that they favored a more humane approach to addressing internal differences and conflicts. While not a perfect relationship, the trend here is so clear that party ideology seems to be a salient factor in shaping conflict-sensitive policies.

As to internal democracy and how inclusive parties are in determining their political and campaign programs, there are mixed results. There are six variables that address internal democracy and how parties determine their political program. Questions 23, 42, 44, 57 and 58, five out of the six variables, all show a consistent relationship between undemocratic practices and conflict-sensitive policies. For example, parties that had a consultative process in which they consulted their local branches, CSOs, and other stakeholders to design their political platform were less likely to show sensitivities toward internal differences, conflicts and a peaceful solution to ethnic, racial and economic cleavages than parties that did not have a consultative process. In other words, parties in which the party leadership determined the party's political program with little influence from the rank-and-file members were more likely to adopt policy positions that can be considered conflict-sensitive. A potential reason for this correlation is that the electorate may be more polarized than party leaders and therefore less likely to call for reconciliatory policies. Party leaders with less public pressure may be able to push through conflict-sensitive policies.

Table 7: Results of Binomial Analysis – Pro-Women Policies

Independent variables		Little to No initiatives to address gender Equality	Significant initiatives to address gender equality
8. Which constituency or socio-economic group does/did the party's founders claim to represent?	Working class, poor, or generally Inclusive	44.4%	55.6%
	Upper classes or exclusive constituency	66.7%	33.3%
	Total	47.6%	52.4%
23. How does the party decide on its policy program document, if it has one?	Policy document designed by committee w/ little consultation	56.2%	43.8%
	Much consultation in design of policy program (branches, CSOs, public consultations, etc.)	38.9%	61.1%
	Total	47.1%	52.9%
26. How, if at all, can the party leadership be held accountable for not following party policy decisions?	Leadership cannot be held accountable	75.0%	25.0%
	Via elections	100.0%	
	Formal body/process established	41.4%	58.6%
	Total	47.1%	52.9%
36. How often, if at all, do members communicate with the party?	One mechanism identified	27.3%	72.7%
	Multiple channels of communication	72.2%	27.8%
	Total	55.2%	44.8%
44. What are the party rules for the process by which candidates to chamber 1 of the national legislature are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election?	Party leadership decides	37.5%	62.5%
	Via elections	64.3%	35.7%
	Total	50.0%	50.0%
49. What, if any, is the quota voluntarily (not required by law) adopted by the party that a certain number or percentage of candidates for nomination will be women?	No quota	50.0%	50.0%
	Quota of < 33%	42.9%	57.1%
	Quota of > 33%	33.3%	66.7%
	Total	45.9%	54.1%
57. What is the process of preparing the party election manifestos?	Top-down, little to no consultation	42.9%	57.1%
	Consultative with constituencies, CSOs and/or local branches	52.9%	47.1%
	Total	48.4%	51.6%
58. Is there a process of working out campaign strategy/operational plan?	No process or top-down	47.8%	52.2%
	Yes, and the process is inclusive	66.7%	33.3%
	Total	51.7%	48.3%
70. What, if any, media outlets are owned by the party or party leadership, nationally or locally?	None	62.5%	37.5%
	At least has a party newspaper or website	37.5%	62.5%
	Total	50.0%	50.0%

Table 7b: Addendum to Pro-Women Policies

Independent variables		Little to no initiatives to address gender equality	Significant initiative to address gender equality
12d. Are there formal internal party quotas for women on this body?	No quota	43.8%	56.2%
	Informal quota	50.0%	50.0%
	Formal quota	41.7%	58.3%
	Total	44.4%	55.6%

12d was the only variable measuring "internal democracy" that showed a positive correlation between internal democracy and a position that can be considered conflict-sensitive. Without further data, particularly qualitative interviews, it is difficult to even theorize why this is the case.

Another encouraging finding was that parties that had many mechanisms by which their members can communicate with the party leader, question 36, were also more likely to support conflict-sensitive policy positions. This means that constituents also support conflict-sensitive policies. This finding again contradicts some of the consultative variables just described, and more data is needed to understand these dynamics.

Similarly, the analysis of question 21 indicates that the existence of formal oversight bodies that monitor the party leadership positions *may* be conducive to a party adopting conflict-sensitive positions. The analysis in Table IX shows that over 75% of the parties that only had informal oversight bodies did not have conflict-sensitive positions, while over 56% of parties with formal oversight bodies were found to demonstrate a significant conflict-sensitive approach in which they presented positions that took into consideration internal ethnic, racial, or regional differences and called for a peaceful approach to addressing them. This finding may be the result of formal oversight bodies requiring party leaders to adhere to party or national constitutions that require all political parties to push for equality and respect of individual and group rights.

Surprisingly, parties that had few incentives promoting women candidates were found to support conflict-sensitive policies more than parties that provided multiple incentives to support women candidates. This finding is buttressed by the data presented in Table IXb. This table presents the analysis between gender quotas and conflict-sensitive policy positions. The table shows that there is no significant trend visible between gender quotas within a party and a party's conflict-sensitivity position. This means a higher percentage of women representatives may not be required for a party to adopt conflict-sensitive policies.

In all, the major finding of the analysis presented in Table 9 confirms the two major findings that we have seen in the previous policy areas – *left leaning parties are more likely to adopt progressive, in this case conflict-sensitive policies, than parties that self-identify as right-of-center. Similarly, parties with undemocratic internal processes tend to show a significant sensitivity to internal differences and conflict.*

Table IX Results of Binomial Analysis – Conflict-Sensitive Policies

Independent variables		No attention paid to conflict or internal differences	Demonstrated sensitivity to internal differences, conflict, and a peaceful solution to internal cleavages
5. How does your party describe itself	Social Democrat, liberal, or left-of-center	38.5%	61.5%
	Conservative, right-of-center, or religious	71.4%	28.6%
	Total	50,0%	50,0%
12.b. By whom are party leaders elected or appointed?	Not elected	100.0%	
	Elected	37.5%	62.5%
	Total	44,4%	55,6%
21. What, if any, formal process exists to monitor and regulate the ethical behaviour of political party officials?	Informal oversight body	75.0%	25.0%
	Formal oversight body	43.8%	56.2%
	Total	50,0%	50,0%
23. How does the party decide on its policy program document, if it has one?	Policy document designed by committee w/ little consultation	44.4%	55.6%
	Much consultation in design of policy program (branches, CSOs, public consultations, etc.)	54.5%	45.5%
	Total	50.0%	50.0%
36. How often, if at all, do members communicate with the party?	One mechanism identified	87.5%	12.5%
	Multiple channels of communication	16.7%	83.3%
	Total	57.1%	42.9%
42. What is the process for s/election of party candidates for presidential elections?	Party leadership decides	42.9%	57.1%
	Via elections @ the local branch or in annual conference	54.5%	45.5%
	Total	50.0%	50.0%
44. What are the party rules for the process by which candidates to chamber 1 of the national legislature are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election?	Party leadership decides	44.4%	55.6%
	Via elections @ the local branch or in annual conference	80.0%	20.0%
	Total	57.1%	42.9%
50. What, if any other, special measures have been adopted by the party to ensure that women are nominated in elections?	No measures	36.4%	63.6%
	At least one measure	66.7%	33.3%
	Total	50.0%	50.0%
57. What is the process of preparing the party election manifestos?	Top-down, little to no consultation	37.5%	62.5%
	Consultative with constituencies, CSOs and/or local branches	75.0%	25.0%
	Total	56.2%	43.8%
58. Is there a process of working out campaign strategy/operational plan?	No process or top-down	46.7%	53.3%
	Yes, and the process is inclusive	100.0%	
	Total	52,9%	47,1%
70. What, if any, media outlets are owned by the party or party leadership, nationally or locally?	None	75.0%	25.0%
	At least has a party newspaper or website	44.4%	55.6%
	Total	58.8%	41.2%

Table 9b: Addendum to Conflict-Sensitive Policies – Closer look at Gender quotas

Independent varables		No attention paid to conflict or internal differences	Demonstrated sensitivity to internal differences, conflict, and a peaceful solution to internal cleavages
49. What, if any, is the quota voluntarily (not required by law) adopted by the party that a certain number or percentage of candidates for nomination will be women?	No quota	53.8%	46.2%
	Quota of < 33%	33.3%	66.7%
	Quota of > 33%	50.0%	50.0%
	Total	50.0%	50.0%
12.d. Are there formal internal party quotas for women on this body?	No quota	37.5%	62.5%
	Informal quota	100.0%	
	Formal quota	37.5%	62.5%
	Total	50.0%	50.0%

5. PILOT PROJECT: DISCUSSION

The data presented above revealed many interesting trends out of which four were particularly noteworthy. These were:

1. Parties that self-identify as left-of-center were consistently more likely to promote pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies than right-of-center parties.

2. Parties with undemocratic processes to (s)elect their leadership and candidates and to determine their political and campaign platforms were also more likely to be progressive in regard to our three policy areas than parties with more internal democratic processes.

3. Parties with gender quotas seem to support pro-poor policies, but there was no consistent relationship between gender quotas and pro-women and conflict-sensitive policies.[14]

4. Parties that provided multiple mechanisms for their members to communicate with the party leaders were found to be more pro-poor and conflict-sensitive, but were not pro-women.

Some of these findings are quite intuitive, and others are quite revealing. For example, it is not surprising that left-of-center parties tend to be more progressive than their conservative counterparts. Left-of-center parties may simply have a more populist rhetoric. However, party ideology is not a perfect indicator of progressive policies. Many conservative parties also supported progressive issues, which points to other factors being at play. To tease out the true relationship between party ideology and party policies, a multivariable research project is needed.

The pilot project points to the importance of party leaders in helping push for progressive policies. The literature on political parties recognizes that party leaders have been known to "lead" or manage their constituents' political opinions by taking positions beyond their party members. Iversen's (1994) detailed study of whether party leaders' views were representative of their constituents' political positions shows that, in all the cases he considered, instead of following

[14] The limitations of the data used for this pilot study may have resulted in this unclear finding. A broader research project that takes into consideration a larger sample of parties and also the nature of the gender quota, whether it was voluntary or imposed by law, can give a better idea of the true relationship between quotas and pro-women policies. The results of the pilot study only indicate, as seen in the case of the SADC, that the existence of gender quotas does not automatically lead to pro-women policies and more needs to be done to address gender inequalities and the special needs of women.

the constituents' views, party elites actually lead them! Iversen (1994) claims that the "leadership of socialist and left parties are to the left of their voters, whereas for all other families (of parties), the elites are shifted to the right of their respective constituencies" (172). In other words, Iversen claims that elites have an important *agenda-setting* role that sheds light on how they manage and *lead* voters' political views. Parties do not follow voters' views, as indicated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) or the Downsian spatial theory (1957), but rather they define new ideas and positions and mobilize voters behind them (see Iversen, 1994: 174-6). The results of the pilot project and Iversen's (1994) theory points to the importance of getting party leadership to 'buy into' a progressive agenda. Party elites have the potential to shape the party agenda to be more progressive and to use different party mechanisms to *massage* voters' political views to come into line with the party's progressive positions.

Another surprising finding from the pilot project was the lack of significance between gender quotas and pro-women policies. There is no clear reasoning why this is the case, but it supports Matlosa's (2005) claim that it takes more than women in the party and legislative leadership to have pro-women policies. Dador (2006) cogently articulates this same point in her study of gender quotas in Peru. She claims that despite women being "nominally" incorporated into party and legislative leadership positions, their subordinated role and the lack of importance given to issues addressing women's political, cultural, social, and economic interests has not changed. Dador goes on to claim that in 2006 Peruvian women made up 49.91% of the electorate and held around 23% of the party leadership posts, yet a pro-women agenda still had not fully developed in Peru. Even further, article 26 of the Law of Political Parties established a 30% minimal quota for either men or women on candidate lists for internal and external elections. Despite all these initiatives, the political discussion of women's issues by the political parties still focuses on traditional themes of maternity, health and family and excludes any policy discussion to promote gender equality in public life. Women's rights and gender equality are matters left to personal conscience and beyond political discourse.[15] In the case of Peru, Dador concludes that the presence of women in the legislature or in the leadership of political parties has not ensured the adoption of pro-women agendas.

Dador's findings are akin to what Matlosa (2005) claims for SADC and what I discussed above about Colombia's Conservative and Liberal Parties. In the Colombian case, despite the Conservative Party having fewer women in elected positions relative to the Liberal Party, both parties had high measures of a pro-women political agenda. This case suggests that other factors besides the presence of women in elected positions are promoting women's issues in these two parties. The low measures of elected women did not seem to hinder the adoption of pro-women policies in both parties. What seems more important is having party leaders buy into a pro-women agenda and setting a political agenda that brings women's issues to the forefront of the party's political agenda.

The last key finding addresses the level of communication from voters *to* party leaders. The pilot project's data points to a positive association between voter-to-party communication and pro-poor and conflict-sensitive policies, but not to women's issues. A potential explanation for this finding is that party activists are mostly men and women's issues may not be among their top political concerns, whereas poverty and conflict issues may be salient issues for them. As discussed above, the lack of gender-mainstreaming among the electorate may partly explain why multiple mechanisms for members to communicate with the parties' leaders may not be sufficient to promote women's issues more effectively or why we should not expect intra-party democratic channels to promote women's rights.

The pilot project suggests that it is very important to get party leaders to buy into a progressive agenda and to mainstream pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies. Internal democratization and increased representation of voters' interests may not be sufficient to promote

[15] Dador (2006) highlights the importance of CSOs in promoting a pro-women agenda. She claims that what seemed to bring women's issues to the fore of political discussion during the election, was the presence of civil society organizations that challenged the political parties to address issues of sexual violence and gender equality (page 6).

progressive policies. However, if party leaders are exposed to the importance of progressive issues or compelled by external forces like a national constitution or international donors to promote progressive issues, they can employ their agenda-setting roles to go beyond voters' present political interests and develop support for pro-poor, conflict-sensitive and gender-equality policies. As seen in the Colombian example, political ideology – whether conservative or liberal – is not an exclusionary or sufficient condition to stymie or promote a progressive agenda. The conservative party in Colombia was found to be both pro-poor and pro-women in its policies. What was important in the Colombian context is that the party leadership in both the Liberal and Conservative parties were committed to gender equality and channeling resources to the poor. In the case of pro-poor policies, the leaders may be rightly representing voters' interests, but in the case of pro-women policies they may actually be going beyond the current views of voters and helping push for a more progressive discourse that would not emerge if the party leaders were not committed to promoting gender equality.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This pilot project used the IDEA database to analyze the relationship between political parties internal settings and the adoption of progressive policies. The database was extensive and well documented. However, its format makes it very difficult to conduct analysis, and I had to come up with ways to code the narratives. IDEA should endeavor to code this data in order to make it accessible for quantitative research. This does not mean that the narrative information should go away, but rather that a coded version of the database should be created. The end product will be two databases, one coded and one narrative.

Another significant gap in the IDEA database is data on policy positions. For the pilot project, I had to research policy positions of parties via a very limited methodology, which resulted in a sub-optimal sample. IDEA should leverage its network and resources to collect this information directly from parties. This could be accomplished via a questionnaire akin to the ones used to collect the data contained in the database.

The pilot project also provided a preliminary view into what internal conditions correlate with progressive policies. Despite the fact that the pilot project was not intended to provide any conclusive findings, it did find some interesting results that sometime ran counter to generally accepted theory, for example, the positive association between undemocratic practices and progressive policies, and the unclear connection between gender quota and pro-women policies in regions such as the SADC. These findings should be seen as initial indications and should be explored further in a more systematic research project that explicitly studies these issues. In particular, the relationship between gender quotas and pro-women policies needs to be teased out, as the limited sample of parties may have led to spurious findings.

The many regional reports developed by IDEA from the data contained in the database and some of the regional and country-specific policy reports are very good at describing the internal conditions of political parties and some policy positions. Yet there has been little effort to link the two or make any causal argument. For example, Matlosa's (2007) report on "Political Parties in Southern Africa" provides an excellent overview of the emergence of political parties, the external regulatory and legislative environment in each country that affects the role and functioning of political parties, and the internal functioning and structure of political parties (page 9). But this report does not attempt to link internal or external conditions with policy outcomes. The same comments can be made of Adejumbi's (2007) report on political parties in West Africa. In short, these regional reports provide an excellent account of the conditions of political parties, but they simply were not intended to conduct any analysis between internal party conditions and a party's policy platform.

Reports that do try to take into account political policies, for their part, fail to draw links between political parties' policies and the potential factors that shape them. Benavides's (2003)

report on "Women's political participation in Bolivia" gives a good account of the political landscape in which women and political parties function. Nonetheless, this particular report stops short of evaluating actual policy positions by parties, and it only provides broad discussions of the cultural and structural factors that hinder the full participation of women in politics. The report makes some allusions to the positive effect that increased participation would have on women's issues, but no further attempt was made to unearth any relationship between potential independent variables and policy positions.

Dador's (2006) report on "Women and Political Participation" in Peru actually does conduct an analysis of whether women's representation leads to pro-women policies. For each party, Dador (2006) presents a series of measures of women's participation as voters, within the party leadership, and in the legislature. Then she goes on to assess the political platform and the role that the presence of women have on the political agenda. This is an excellent case study, but it is akin to the present pilot project, but with only two variables – women representation and pro-women policies. Like the pilot project, or even more so because it provides a thick description of a country case, the results of Dador's work is an excellent starting point for actually studying what conditions may lead political parties to adopt progressive policies. But to be able to identify some robust causal relations, Dador's report needs to be broadened to look at a wide range of independent variables. In other words, a more systematic research project is needed.

In 2008 IDEA published a series of country-specific reports on women and political parties in the Andean region. These reports vary in their analysis of the relationship between women in politics and pro-women policies. Cañate (2008), for example, provides a detailed overview of the process by which women in Ecuador have increased their role in the various political parties and political movements. Cañate's (2008) analysis focuses on the adoption, application, and evolution of the gender quota, but does not try to address any pro-women policies, not overtly at least. Cañate sees gender quotas as ends in themselves, and does not try to link them to broader pro-women policies. Llanos (2008) presents a very useful analysis of Peruvian women in politics, and the measures adopted by political parties to promote women's issues. Llanos goes so far as to provide a ranking of parties that have adopted pro-women policies and those who have only proclaimed rhetorical support for gender equality. Llanos concludes that despite the presence of gender quotas and an increase in women's participation in party leadership and electoral processes, "gender equality is foreign to most political parties…in terms of party structure and political platforms" (page 19). Thus, gender quotas have not been effective at raising the importance of women's issues in Peru. Like Dador, Llanos' analysis finds that gender quotas are insufficient to promote a pro-women agenda.

Lastly, in 2008 the "Campaign for More Women More Politics" published a report which ranked Colombian parties according to how pro-women they were in their internal structure, their electoral processes, and policies. This report is very useful at providing indexed measures that can be used to easily rank and compare Colombian parties. As mentioned above, the report does not find a clear link between gender representation in elected office and pro-women policy. Looking at the two major parties makes this point clear. The Liberal and Conservative Parties both have high measures of internal gender equality, but in electoral measures the Liberal Party is more than twice as pro-women as the conservative party. Despite such variance between the two parties, both the Conservative and the Liberal Party were found to have the highest measures of pro-women policy proposals. This report is the closest thing to a multi-variable analysis to study the relationship between women in politics and pro-women policies and should be a model of conducting single case-studies.

Beyond IDEA and the UNDP, other organizations have also fallen short of linking the internal and external conditions of parties with their policy choices. For example, EISA's work in Southern Africa has produced an encyclopedic account of political party systems (Olaleye, 2003) and women's policy (EISA, 2008). But these reports make no effort to link or even theorize what conditions lead political parties to adopt progressive policies.

Thus, there is a glaring gap in the knowledge of what conditions lead political parties to adopt progressive policies that benefit the poor, advance gender equality, and promote peace. The pilot project provides an initial, albeit imperfect, approach to leveraging the data housed in the IDEA database to better understand the conditions that may help political parties adopt progressive policies. But the pilot project should be expanded to become a more systematic study that would be cross-country and multivariate.

Recommended Areas for Further Research

The most obvious research need is to mirror and expand the aforementioned country-specific research projects by replicating the pilot project for more countries. The specific steps that are needed are the following:

1. **Expand data collection to include policy positions:** The pilot project's limited data collection methodology that focuses on party manifestos, political platforms, and similar documents provides an initial approach to the type of data that needs to be collected and how to go about collecting it. A more thorough approach can focus on collecting data from actual legislative initiatives and voting records by each party. This methodology would be comprehensive enough to capture not only rhetorical commitments to pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive policies, but also actual actions to support these progressive policies. This data collection process should be designed and implemented for other countries and for other policy areas. Once the information on policy positions is gathered, a ranking process akin to the Colombian Gender-Equality ranking should then be developed to easily compare political parties.

2. **Expand and code existing database:** The policy data/rankings should then be added to the current database. More importantly, the current database needs to be coded. I developed a series of simple nominal and ordinal schemas to code the data for the 23 variables used in the pilot project. This schema can be implemented for the rest of the variables and the rest of the parties in the database. The biographical data currently contained in the database is still useful and can be leveraged by researchers to expand on the findings.

3. **Conduct Multivariable Analysis:** Analysis can take a subset of the 23 independent variables used in the pilot project (i.e. the ones that indicated some type of relationship to the different policy areas), and then statistical methods can be used to uncover what conditions lead parties to adopt/support progressive policies.

4. **Continue with the regional and country-specific case studies:** Quantitative analyses are good up to a certain extent to disclose trends, but country specific studies are invaluable to truly understand the causal mechanisms behind progressive policies. In other words, the case study reports should continue, but these should explicitly aim to further study the relationship between internal party conditions and the policies they support/promote.

5. **Beyond research, to promote progressive policies, focus on the party elites:** One of the main implications of the pilot project is the important role that party leaders play in setting the political agenda and leading their constituencies' political interests. Based on this preliminary relation, one of the immediate strategies that the donor community can adopt to promote progressive policies such as pro-poor, pro-women, and conflict-sensitive is focus attention on mainstreaming these progressive ideas among the party leaders. Once the party leaders accept the importance of these progressive policies, they can set a political agenda that can then also mainstream gender sensitivity among voters.

6. **Promoting programmatic parties:** Programmatic parties are conducive to progressive policies. Their promotion of policies that provide non-contingent public goods is a key element in supporting progressive policies that are aimed to benefit the entire so-

ciety. Moreover, programmatic political systems are also more likely to have a higher state capacity to implement policies. A political system based on clientelist relations reduces state capacity to implement any type of initiative, because it does not promote a state apparatus based on a capable bureaucracy.

Thus, a programmatic party system is essential for the promotion of progressive policies. The literature on programmatic parties highlights several ways to promote programmatic party systems:

- ***Electoral institutions and processes*** are key elements in promoting programmatic parties. Creating an external environment in which political parties are compelled to develop a political platform for each election that clearly outlines their respective policy preferences, is a major step to promoting political dialogue within the party, even if it is a non-consultative approach.
- ***Establishing an independent state bureaucracy*** would limit parties' ability to reward and punish voters. Creating an independent state bureaucracy based on merit and not political allegiance would lessen the clientelist incentives available to parties.
- ***Establishing procurement and transparency boards*** to monitor both state actions and political parties would be an enormous step in ensuring non-clientelist behavior.

Taken together, these six recommendations can be grouped into three proposals:

1. Conduct further research as outlined above;
2. Concentrate training and outreach efforts on political elites; and
3. Promote conditions that would lead to programmatic political parties.

These proposals are aimed at advancing our understanding of, and promoting, the conditions that lead political parties to adopt programmatic approaches and progressive policies.

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